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The UK Government’s Minister for Telecoms, Sir Chris Bryant MP, has told the Joint Committee’s ongoing Undersea Cables Inquiry that they will need to draft new laws in order to better address the growing risk of deliberate sabotage against our vital subsea fibre optic cables – responsible for carrying much of the world’s internet data traffic.
Damage to submarine cables is, sadly, not uncommon. According to the UN’s ICPC (here), an average of 150 to 200 faults occur globally each year and require about three cable repairs per week. In addition, it usually takes a few weeks to fix a break, but this depends upon the type of break, its depth, weather conditions and various other factors.
Most of these cable breaks occur due to accidents by deep sea fishing trawlers, as well as ships accidentally dragging their anchor over them. Not to mention abrasion, equipment failure or marine life deciding to take a nibble (the latter is only really an issue for smaller / older cables that haven’t been buried). But over the past year, the act of deliberate sabotage has also become a much more real concern (example).
Suffice to say that there are some well-known vulnerabilities with this infrastructure, but existing responses are largely focused upon repairs. This is partly because monitoring such long, and often very hard to reach (deep), cables is an extremely difficult and costly thing to do (solutions are being tested). Similarly, identifying the actual cause and source of such damage can also be a challenge.
Protection is a challenge
The recently published National Security Strategy (summary) didn’t add much to the debate, except to confirm that the Royal Navy would take a “leading and coordinating role” in securing undersea infrastructure. Under Operation Atlantic Bastion, this “will counter the persistent and growing underwater threats from Russian submarines and the shadow fleet … Changes to our Rules of Engagement means our warships can now do more to track vessels we suspect of spying or conducting sabotage.”
The ten-nation Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is also increasing efforts to track potential threats to subsea infrastructure and the Russian shadow fleet at its Operational HQ in Northwood. “Our NATO allies are helping us defend our waters through the UK-hosted NATO Maritime Command, as well as Operation Baltic Sentry, which ensures Russian ships cannot operate in secrecy near UK or NATO territory,” said the strategy document.
However, in terms of law and punishment, the UK government acknowledged on Monday that the existing Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 would need more than a few simple tweaks in order to update it for the current climate. At present the law can only impose a £1,000 fine, which is hardly much of a deterrent against costly cable damage accidents related to negligence or even sabotage, particularly those that occur in the gray zone of conflict (e.g. deliberately using civilian vessels to cause damage). Not to mention the problem of extending any law beyond the UK’s territorial waters.
Chris Bryant, UK Telecoms Minister, said (video):
“We’re in a bit of a double bind because, on the one hand, the 1885 Act the £100 fine provision was upgraded in 1982 to £1,000, and we could, by secondary legislation, [raise it up] to £5,000, but that just doesn’t seem to meet the needs of the situation.”
The reality today is that cutting lots of transatlantic fibre optic cables within the same short period of time, while a risk, is something that would be both extremely difficult to completely prevent and to actually carry out. On the other hand, the more such attacks take place, the greater the strain on limited resources for repairs, which could result in a build-up of cumulative delays and thus connectivity problems.
The same sort of attacks and strategies could then of course be used against an aggressor. The fact that so much international trade is carried over the internet also means that other countries are likely to be harmed by such an activity, which in a conflict may end up including the attacking state or its allies to some extent (i.e. directly or indirectly).
Equally, any new laws will have to be careful not to draft legislation that might end up punishing genuine accidents too harshly. The catch is that introducing new laws tends to be an extremely slow process, which might take another 1-2 years to run its course, during which time there will continue to be a lack of effective legislation.