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The news comes as yet another submarine cable is damaged in the Baltic Sea, with authorities suspecting deliberate sabotage
The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS) is set to explore the security credentials of the UK’s submarine cable ecosystem as part of a new industry enquiry.
In its announcement, the government noted the UK’s reliance on its 60 existing submarine cables, warning of the potential disruption that damage to multiple cables at once would cause the UK.
The JCNSS makes clear that the enquiry is a direct response to the rise in submarine cable damage incidents in recent years, which have shed light on the potential vulnerabilities of this critical infrastructure.
The Baltic Sea has seen a slew of submarine cable incidents since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with many of these cable cuts – intentional or otherwise – being linked to Russian and Chinese vessels. The increasing frequency of cable damage in the region and suspicions of foul play have led NATO to deploy patrol ships to the region as part of a mission called ‘Baltic Sentry’.
“Although the Government has taken a number of steps to improve maritime security, alongside Allies and partners, concern has been growing over Russian and Chinese capabilities to hold undersea infrastructure at risk – particularly during periods of heightened tension or conflict,” explained the JCNSS in their call for evidence.
More specially, the JCNSS is asking the submarine cable industry for support in answering the following questions:
- How might the UK’s reliance on undersea cables evolve over the next 10–15 years?
- Who are the main threat actors and what are their capabilities?
- What developments are expected in subsea technologies over the next 10 years?
- How resilient are the UK public and private sectors likely to be in the event of major disruption?
- How effective are the deterrents against the targeting of our undersea cables? Are any improvements needed regarding: maritime security capabilities; military strategy; engagements with Allies and partners; and legal frameworks, including options for redress?
- How well is policy and co-ordination working across Whitehall departments, law enforcement and private sector actors? Are any changes needed?
- In the context of limited resources, what is the appropriate balance to strike between enhancing domestic resilience on the one hand, and improving detection and interdiction on the other?
“Our internet relies on undersea cables: around 99% of our data goes through them, connecting the UK to the outside world,” said the committee chair, Matt Western MP.
“As the geopolitical environment worsens, foreign states are seeking asymmetric ways to hold us at risk. Our internet cable network looks like an increasingly vulnerable soft underbelly.
“There is no need for panic—we have a good degree of resilience, and awareness of the challenge is growing. But we must be clear-eyed about the risks and consequences: an attack of this nature would hit us hard. Our inquiry will look at what’s needed to defend our subsea cables, and consider the UK’s national resilience should our internet face major disruption,” he added.
Submissions to the enquiry must be made by 6th March 2025.
Results of the enquiry can surely not come soon enough, with yet another submarine cable cut in the Baltic being reported on Sunday, despite NATO’s presence in the region. The cable, which links Sweden and Latvia, was reportedly the victim of “gross sabotage” according to Swedish investigators.
Is the submarine cable industry doing enough to secure this critical infrastructure from deliberate sabotage? Join the discussion at Submarine Networks EMEA
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